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A FEW NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL OWNERSHIP IN THE SPHERES OF CULTURE AND FILM IN SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1970S
Gal Kirn
Institut for Slavistics, Humboldt University of Berlin
' is text critically evaluates how the idea of self-management changed and materialized in Yugoslavia, 
especially during the sixties and seventies. ' e " rst section presents a general overview of politics 
concerning self-management and its paradoxical and contradictory unfolding, while the second section 
focuses on the contours of the Yugoslav cultural sphere, especially in the " eld of " lm from the late " ( ies 
to the early seventies. More concretely, the author intends to sketch the ways in which social ownership 
and self-management forms were inscribed in cultural infrastructure and budget planning, drawing 
a) ention to the precarious status of cultural work.
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Introduction
When mainstream ideological discourse pays a& ention to the name of the socialist Yugosla-
via, it either forces us to violently forget it and reduce it to the “totalitarian” past, or it ideal-
izes the good old times, where Tito’s rule worked for the bene' t of all. / is ideological duo 
of anti-totalitarian and Yugonostalgic discourse not only reduces the historical complexity 
of the socialist past, but even to a certain degree blocks any thought of an emancipatory 
present and/or future, standing as an apologetic of the past or present times. What follows 
should therefore not be read as part of a (Yugo)nostalgic account, but rather as intending to 
launch both a critical and a0  rmative evaluation of the politics of self-management, which 
today deserves a more precise historicization and contextualisation. I wish to join in with 
the assessments made by theorists such as Dolenec and (itko1 and the most recent study 
of Suvin (2014), who tackle the problem of theoretical re* ection on self-management and 
social property as constitutive for understanding socialism, and particularly the Yugoslav ex-
periment. Anyone who is interested in the emancipatory and le+ ist reading of struggles for 
the commons and critiques of a contemporary crisis of the capitalist mode of production, 
should also evaluate and compare concrete historical experiences that a& empted to invent 
both an anti-capitalist and anti-state mode of regulation. Let us not forget that the Yugoslav 
self-management project was initiated in a time of isolation from the West and East.2
In order to critically evaluate how the idea of self-management changed and materialized, 
I will ' rst give a general overview of self-management politics and its paradoxical unfold-
1 Dolenec and (itko's text convincingly tackles the importation of the problem of commons in the Yugoslav context: they suggest 
that social ownership already was a form of commons, and that it was connected to a larger anti-capitalist project that strives for 
the abolition of private property (2013). / e theory of commons is nowadays mostly associated with the work of Hardt and Negri 
(2009). For a good criticism see also Harvey (2010).
2 Apart from the afore-mentioned studies my own dissertation analyzes the details concerning the transition a+ er 1965 and the 















































































ing, while in the second part I shall focus on the contours of the Yugoslav cultural scene, 
especially in the ' eld of & lm from the late 1950s to the early 1970s.3 / e introduction of 
social property and self-management forms will be evaluated via the nascent cultural infra-
structure, budget planning and the status of cultural workers. Some of the following theses 
will remain cursory; because of the spatial limit I cannot give a more precise statistical and 
historical analysis, but I will emphasize the most vital shi+ s within cinematic production and 
organisation over the sixties and seventies.
A Few Notes on Self-Management and Social Ownership
Yugoslavian socialist self-management was born in the early 1950s and moved both ideologi-
cally and politically beyond the dichotomy of state and market, in many respects contribut-
ing to the invention of a speci' c form of ownership: social ownership. One can immediately 
object that workers’ self-management was imposed “from above”, by the communist leader-
ship. However, even if this was true on the formal level of laws and control of the party, one 
should nevertheless trace the causes of the emergence of self-management from the split 
with Stalin and the Informbiro in 1948. A+ er this ex-communication, Yugoslavia became 
isolated from the West and East and the policy of workers’ self-management was designed to 
sustain strong popular support for the Yugoslav independent path to socialism. Taken from 
a more theoretical perspective,4 self-management can be de' ned as a political practice that 
targeted two major points: on the one hand it continued to dismantle capitalist exploita-
tion; while on the other hand, it exerted an internal critique within the international workers’ 
movement targeting state socialism and a hierarchical nationalized planned economy that 
minimized workers’ democratic forms. Despite internal strife within the Communist Party 
over a clear future orientation for the Party, the argument against state ownership won5 and 
the politics of the “nationalization” of economic capacities and infrastructure was identi' ed 
as consisting of excessive bureaucratic control, thus constituting a (gradual) defeat of the 
path to communism. As regards the realization of communism, Yugoslav communists called 
for a return to Lenin and his idea of a “withering away of state”.6 / is demanded not only a 
critique of bureaucratic control, but also a real process that moved away from “nationaliza-
tion” to “socialization” of the means of production and consequently, also of the means of re-
production. In 1950 the ' rst formal step was taken when adopting the Basic Law on Manage-
ment of State Economic Enterprises and Higher Economic Associations by the Workers’ Collective,7 
while the politics of self-management had long-term consequences for socialist reproduction 
and development in Yugoslavia. 
For the sake of brevity one should emphasize that this reform introduced new political 
forms – workers’ councils – into all production units (socialist enterprises), where the major-
ity consisted of employees/workers, and who would also delegate their members to higher 
3 I will mostly leave out the ' rst two periods of the Yugoslav ' lm history; the early a+ er-war years were mostly marked by the cen-
tralized studio and funding system with strong ideological control, while the 1950s were marked by a gradual decentralisation. For a 
good ' lm history of these periods see Goulding (2001: 32-61), and Kosanovi% (1966).
4 Markovi%, one of philosophers from Marxist-Praxis school gave a good analysis of the theoretical sources of socialist self-ma-
nagement (1975).
5 Boris Kidri" was the chief political economist and minister for the economy, who most openly called for the critique of state 
socialism. For a lucid interpretation see Suvin (2014: 61-66).
6 For a good comment on and historical evaluation of this politics see also Samary (1988).
7 / e summary of the most important points of this law can be found in English at: h& ps://www.marxists.org/subject/yugosla-
via/self-management/1950/06/x01.htm.
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political levels of workers’ representation. Unquestionably, the policy of self-management 
was adapted to historical circumstances and political discussions, and became a dominant 
ideology into which many di) erent ideological forms translated. One of the central features 
of the self-management model was its constant renewal, but that does not mean that the 
development unfolded without contradictions and transitions. Socialism in its immanent 
constellation is a compromise form, which combines capitalist and communist elements, 
thus presenting a mixed economy. Broadly, we could argue that at least until the mid 1960s, 
the politics of self-management proved to be successful in improving material infrastructure, 
well-being and the life of the vast majority of people in Yugoslavia, while over the last two 
decades we have seen the process of the exhaustion of communist politics.8
In the reality of the 1950s, the self-management model stood mostly for the empow-
erment of workers in the organization of economic units, while on a more political level 
self-management was identi' ed with the process of decentralization. / is meant a gradual 
empowerment of the lower levels of governing, such as republics and (municipal and local) 
communities, who fought against the bureaucratic monopoly of political and economic pow-
er. It also meant a proliferation of self-management forms into other non-economic ' elds of 
society: culture, science, health system, education, housing and so forth. In terms of political 
economy, what used to be regulated by a more homogenous bureaucratic force that disposed 
with social capital in the name of working class was now more and more decentralized. In-
stead of bureaucracy we can locate technocracy (a social strata of experts and directors in fac-
tories, bank managers) as the agency that managed multiple independent capitals. / us, we 
can de' ne “social ownership” as a paradoxical formation, whereby the means of production, 
land, (social) housing did not belong to anyone, but to the whole society. As Rastko Mo"nik 
claimed, “social ownership could have been able to permit the opening up of new horizons 
in the ma& er of political practices, if its political potential had not been sapped by the appa-
ratuses of social management” (2010). Moreover, the legal theorist Drago Bajt spoke about 
the “double inscription” of social ownership into legal and economic aspects, which meant 
that “legally enterprise would be the owner of the means of production, whereas the work-
ers would manage it in reality. / e workers’ collective was then the economic owner of the 
means of production” (Bajt 1975: 159). In other words, the enterprise had the “right of dis-
posal”, while the workers’ collective had “managing rights”. / e major obstacle in the regime 
of social property was located in the improper institutional solution that might properly im-
plement this division of ownership rights between the workers’ collective and enterprise. 
/ e sociologist Veljko Rus claims that: 
the workers’ collective would decide about ma& ers that relate to management, while the 
enterprise or rather its representatives would decide on ma& ers that related to disposal. 
If workers themselves would accumulate means/resources in their working organisation, 
then they would be also the owners of the enterprise’s capital, while if these means would 
be invested by other subjects, e.g. banks, foreign investors etc., then they would have the 
disposal rights. (Rus 1988: 19)
Due to its formal vagueness, social property very early on hit multiple political and “struc-
tural” obstacles: from the mixing of workers’ political participation with the shareholding 
tendency to a greater role that would be played by the market, that is, by the strengthening 
of the capitalist tendency which would push it in the direction of private property. / e loca-
8 Again this evaluation and schematic split on Yugoslavia before 1965 and a+ er 1965 relies mostly on the works of Kirn (2012a) 
and Suvin (2014).
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tion of class struggle was concentrated much less around the form and question of property, 
and much more around the question of management, appropriation and the distribution of 
value. / is was the key site where the paradox of self-management could be located. 
Self-managed worker(s) > < Self-managed community 
Exchange
Founding moment: “total” alienation of 
means of production, nationalisation of 
industry
State property 
A+ er 1950 social property (paradox of property in 
hands of none and all members of society)
1. Schema of social-economic relations
Workers: labour force
(production)
appropriation of surplus 
value
State: proponents bureaucracy/ (planning)
Market: proponents technocrats/
(organisation)




Bureaucracy – political representatives
Technocracy – economic representatives
Self-managing interest communities
Schema of the Social Contract of the Self-managed Community
/ e major shi+  within the socialist transition took place in the period of so-called “market 
socialism”, which came into existence a+ er 1965. Market reform was executed in the name of 
democratization and decentralization and the broadening of self-management rights, which 
eventually led to a real transfer of political and economic power. But what did this mean in 
politico-economic practice? Formally, it meant that workers could now have more say over 
their own wage, thus they participated directly in the question of the distribution of surplus 
value. But was it really workers, who decided upon key questions such as: who, what and how 
to produce and re-invest? Rather than bureaucracy, it was technocracy which gained the upper 
hand in the sphere of production. We might agree with the following general assessment by 
Diane Flaherty:
However, by de' ning self-management as autonomy of the smallest production unit (…) 
reforms decentralized to the point that conscious coordination of any sort was rendered 
virtually impossible … Each new decentralization pi& ed ever larger numbers of ever small-
er production units against each other, sacri' cing inter1unit cooperation for expected im-
provement in intra1unit equality. Market reforms at the same time had already increased 
competitive pressure on self1managed ' rms and BOALS, reducing the expected gains 
in intra1unit equality as ' rms turned to experts to save them from failure in the face of 
chaotic market conditions. (11)
In other words, production units increasingly followed market criteria, which meant the 
maximisation of surplus value, which not only produced stronger competition among pro-
duction units, but also between workers. Susan Woodward (1995) rightly showed that the 
market reform actually reduced the level of employment, since the enterprises secured the 
accumulated value and conserved the privileges, rather than employing new labour power. 
Apart from changes in the regime of accumulation of independent capital on the level of 
enterprise, decentralization empowered individual republics, which de facto became bear-
ers of political and economic sovereignty. / e federation was becoming a confederation as 
early as the late 1960s and the socio-economic mechanisms for solidarity that were earlier 
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sustained on the federal level – via the National Bank and Fund for Development – were 
bracketed.9 With integration into global ' nancial circuits, the monetary capacities and pow-
er to give credits were vested into (commercial) banks, which became the most important 
agents of liberalism and bearers of “individual” social property. To sum up, market reform 
was supported by the leading communist cadres, yet promoted the richer republics of the 
North (Slovenia, Croatia) and technocrats, who became both a part of the ruling class and 
representatives of the capitalist tendency. Market socialism created multiple centrifugal 
forces that worked towards disintegration. In some way we could argue that it took certain 
negative aspects of market (de)regulation and state correctives (taking responsibility for bad 
investments), while we might also say that this period succeeded more in the expansion of 
the model of self-management to other, non-economic activities, amongst which cultural 
production is one important ' eld and example.
Cultural Policy in Yugoslavian Cinematography: From Film 
Infrastructure to “Techniques to the People” 
How was the transition to self-managing forms of organisation achieved in the cultural ' eld? 
In this section I intend to illustrate changes in the marketization of social ownership on the 
' eld of ' lm infrastructure and production. Katja Praznik’s recent illuminative dissertation 
sketches the institutional frame and shi+ s within cultural organisations in the following man-
ner:
– up until 1948 cultural ma& ers were strictly regulated through the “federal ministry of 
culture and each republic’s ministry of education (…). In combination with popular com-
mi& ees on three levels” (Praznik 2013: 108). / is also meant a very centralized funding sys-
tem with strong ideological control.10
– between 1953 and 1974 political authority instead of federal and republican author-
ity implemented executive “councils and commissions for education and culture, where the 
president and parts of the members were nominated by government, whereas others were 
delegated to associations and cultural institutions” (2013: 108-109);
– from 1974 till 1989 instead of a municipal commi& ee and republican council, regu-
lation came into the hands of the municipal cultural community and cultural community 
of each republic, where members were voted in through the council of (cultural) users and 
producers (ibid.: 109).
In the ' eld of cinematography and generally in culture, the infrastructure a+ er WWII was 
completely destroyed, thus it had to be re-built. Also, Yugoslav ' lm had no serious nor long-
term ' lm production or dissemination before WWII (.entevska 2012: 96-100; Goulding 
2002: 1-61). In line with the above categorization, the sphere of culture was at ' rst strongly 
connected to state regulation and the ministry of culture, which in practice meant saturation 
and the impregnation of all cultural products with propagandistic and ideological means. 
However, at the congress of writers in 1952, Miroslav Krle!a’s intervention stated a clear re-
jection and abandoning of socialist realism from the cultural workers themselves; this would 
be generally referred to as the opening up to a socialist aesthetic modernism, which promot-
ed the independent path of Yugoslavia into socialism (Goulding 2002; Zimmerman 2010).
9 For more on the structural changes see chapter 7 of my dissertation (Kirn 2012a).
10 See Gabri" (1995) and Goulding (2002).
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Nevertheless, as early as in 1946 the Party instituted a cultural policy called “Technique 
to the People”, which later yielded unanticipated e) ects. / e socialist authority established a 
special institution “Narodna Tehnika” (the Popular Engineering Society), which concentrat-
ed on amateur and informal radio,11 as well as photographic and ' lm infrastructure and other 
activities. At this point the ministry for culture remained in charge of larger investments, 
the building of infrastructure and ideological control, while in the 1950s, it was substituted 
by the municipal and local communities. / e la& er were expected to be involved in se& ing 
up the cultural infrastructure in such away as to enhance the mediation and socialisation of 
technology. Ana Janevska’s recent study noted that the major aim of the policy “Technique to 
the People” was to “organize, sponsor and promote di) erent amateur activities. Even though 
they were under the ‘political’ control of the centre and were hierarchically organized, they 
were mostly le+  to their own devices as peripheral ‘amateur reservations’”(2012: 4). From 
the late 1950s onwards this “hierarchical” and “political” control relaxed and agit-prop com-
missions were dissolved.12 / is does not mean that the Yugoslav political leadership no long-
er a& empted to discursively set certain guidelines, but it would be erroneous to speak of an 
atmosphere of complete repression and the absence of freedom. 
/ ere were two further important changes in the 1950s in the ' eld of the ' lm industry. 
First, the totality of ' lm activity was reorganized in three areas. As Ian Goulding described 
& lm production fell
under the category of economic activity with “special cultural signi' cance”; & lm trade un-
der the category of domestic and international commerce; and networks of & lm distribution 
and theatrical shows under the category of “service activities of a communal character”.13
/ ese changes would in reality result in a transformed “tripartite division” of labour in ' lm 
activities: a) “enterprises and workers involved in technical bases of ' lm”; b) ' lm studios that 
would allocate economic resources, contract personnel, services … [which] “became the 
sole owners of the ' nished ' lm”, and ' nally c) “free associations of ' lm-artistic workers”.14 
/ ese artistic workers were from the 1950s onwards positioned as “freelance” workers, who 
entered into short-term contracts with the ' lm studios. In this tripartite system everything 
revolved around the ' lm studios.
/ e last big legal change formalized these processes in 1956 when the Basic Law on Film 
was introduced. Apart from the funding via republics, the law instituted a di) erentiated sys-
tem of “self-' nancing”, which would transfer 15% of ' lm admission tickets directly to the ' lm 
production. Decentralisation in the early years also meant the downsizing of the ' rst big ' lm 
studio, as the other ' lm studios started to operate in all other republics. Due to opening up to 
the West, the improved Yugoslavian ' lm infrastructure yielded a large growth in audiences; 
the pro' t gained by this was transferred back to domestic ' lm production.15 
In the improved economic conditions and conscious investment in domestic production 
and with the strengthened activity of ' lm theory and criticism the grounds were prepared for 
the emergence of the most productive period in the history of Yugoslav ' lm.
11 Nek se "uje i na# glas is an amazing short documentary by Krsto Papi%, which shows that the period of the 1960s was marked by 
a creative proliferation of pirate radio stations developed in the countryside, where people were broadcasting on a diverse range of 
subjects from music and recipes, to shows and political discussions. It is this popular activity that came into con* ict with the o0  cial 
licensing authorities that would give away the frequencies.
12 See also Ale# Gabri"’s (1995) study on the speci' c ideological contours of cultural policy.
13 Goulding (2002: 35, emphasis added).
14 Goulding (2002: 35-36).
15 Goulding (2002: 37-38).
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Cinema Clubs as Preparatory Grounds for the Film Explosion: 
The Unveiling of the Paradox of Self-Management?
Despite the importance of this legal and economical infrastructure that was organized by the 
state and republics, we ought to bring into account yet another important grassroots self-
management infrastructure, which played a huge role in the development of the new Yugo-
slav ' lm. Ana Janevski analyzed an almost forgo& en part of Yugoslav ' lm history: cinema 
clubs.16 Cinema clubs emerged in all big Yugoslav cities: Split, Novi Sad, Zagreb, Belgrade, 
Ljubljana, Sarajevo etc. / ey were social spaces where people watched ' lms together and 
engaged in (in)formal discussions, via self-organized education. It was in these clubs, where 
the underground, experimental and amateur young people started work on interdiscipli-
nary projects that would bridge cinema with other arts and media. Aside from their primary 
function regarding the socialisation of technology and cinematography, cinema clubs also 
worked as small independent production units. Amateur cinema received public assistance 
and young directors o+ en worked with 8 mm and 16 mm ' lm tapes. Many of the amateurs 
and self-educated ' lm-makers from these cinema clubs later became internationally re-
nowned ' lm-makers.17 Importantly, cinema clubs were crucial spaces where alternative and 
low-budget ' lm festivals took place: ' rst, there were festivals of amateur ' lm that rotated 
between cinema clubs and created the ' lm platforms for all-Yugoslav discussion and amateur 
production; and second, in 1963 Zagreb’s cinema club launched the GEFF: the biannual 
Genre Experimental Film Festival.18 Janevski rightly asserts that GEFF’s inclination “to con-
nect all human activities was expressed, not only in the ' eld of art, but in science and tech-
nology as well, overlapping with broader world tendencies and interest in ' lm as a subject 
of historical and theoretical research” (2012: 16). Cinema clubs assumed multiple roles and 
functioned both as a creative experimental laboratory for new practices on the one hand and 
as a speci' c self-management amateur production unit on the other. 
/ ere are competing interpretations concerning the naming, timing and even method of 
the new Yugoslav ' lm-Black Wave.19 I arguably pick the year 1963 as the founding year of this 
new Yugoslav ' lm. In this year three young ' lm-directors: (ivojin Pavlovi%, Marko Babac, 
and Kokan Rakonjac – directed their second omnibus City.20 / e ' lm was o0  cially banned. 
What followed is particularly illuminating for one of the central paradoxes of Yugoslav self-
management. / e banning of this ' lm led many to expect and suspect that a tough repression 
of the * ourishing arts at that time would ensue,21 possibly leading to a crackdown on cinema 
clubs and all critical ' lm production. To the contrary, the next 10 years became the most 
exciting years in the whole history of Yugoslav ' lm and became referred to as a “golden age” 
of Yugoslav ' lm.22
Apart from assigning cinema clubs and underground cultural milieu an important role, 
this paradox further proves the inadequacy of the binary opposition between underground 
16 Ana Janevski (2012: 4-16). See also the catalogue of the exhibition on cinema clubs, edited by Pi#kur and Soban (2011). It is 
noteworthy that also in other Western and Eastern countries cinema clubs existed and provided a strong basis for cinephilic culture.
17 As early as1955 Du#an Makavejev ' lmed PE1AT, whilst Kokan Rakonjac directed BELA MA2 MICA.
18 It was held in 1965, 1967 and 1970.
19 For an interesting and critical dialogue see especially DeCuire (2010) and Jovanovi% (2012).
20 Ian Goulding (2002) argues that the Black Wave had already started in 1961 with ' lms that addressed existentialist and ro-
mantic themes usually associated with the French new wave. For example, DVOJE (AND LOVE HAS VANISHED) was directed by 
Aleksandar Pavlovi%. It unfolds into2an existentialist dilemma of a couple, which transforms into a love triangle; another very poetic 
work is PLES V DE/JU (DANCING IN THE - IN), directed by Bo#tjan Hladnik. 
21 For more information on the * ourishing of modernism in Yugoslavia see Germani (2010).
22 Cf. Vukovi% (2010: 53).
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art (dissident) and o0  cial state (repression), which in more recent readings * irts with certain 
dissident paradigms which place an overemphasis on repression in socialist times.23 How 
could it then be possible that such an immense and critical level of ' lm production was sus-
tained for the whole decade and especially as some of the ' lms openly criticized socialist 
authority? Pavle Levi (2007) rightly assumes that the existence of these critical ' lms was a 
sign of freedom in self-management. I would add that the self-management conditions and 
infrastructure opened ways for more * exible production techniques and the dissemination 
of movies. What is more, the real paradox lay with the fundamental premises of a socialist 
authority that (over)valued the role of ' lm in cultural and political education. In this context 
most of the ' lms received a huge reception and as (elimir (ilnik claims, all critical ' lms 
received an immense amount of review and (media) coverage. / is meant that political au-
thorities were worried about what precisely came onto the (cinematic) screens and therefore 
invested much e) ort in persuading those critics of socialist authority that were misrepresent-
ing socialist reality.24
Cinema clubs evidently could not be completely autonomous, since they needed to rely 
on the technical infrastructure that was provided by the major ' lm studios in all the socialist 
republics (Avala, Viba, Jadran).25 / e formal infrastructure was used and rented by amateurs 
from the cinema clubs as well. (ilnik acknowledges: “/ is was a time when ' lmmaking was 
entirely dependent on ' lm technology and infrastructure (…) [which was] not only expen-
sive, but also extremely inaccessible. / e process depended on huge laboratories, editing ta-
bles and machines that not even all the federal republics had” (2012: 92). Finally, at least two 
independent and young ' lm-makers every year were given the opportunity to make feature 
' lms at the major ' lm studios.
Independent Film Production: Neoplanta as a Paradigmatic Case 
of Social Ownership in Yugoslav Cinema
One should also note that from the early 1960s ' lm – like music – bene' ted progressive-
ly from the market reforms, thanks to its relatively well-organised infrastructure. In other 
words, the ' elds of music and ' lm developed a certain market with growing audiences, 
which as sales showed, could be measured not only in the growing domestic market, but also 
on the international ' lm market. On the one hand this ' lm market entered into Yugoslavia 
with major co-productions, whilst on the other Yugoslav ' lm production invested in market-
ing a genre of partisan ' lms, which became its trade-mark. Also, the alternative auteur ' lms 
travelled to international ' lm festivals. / e conditions of “autonomy” within the ' lm ' eld 
were materially present in the hybrid of market and state support.
Due to the growing * exibility of the economy and the implementation of market criteria, 
the ' lm industry demanded improved ' nancial revenues. / e big ' lm companies thus de-
manded an even more precarious contractual relationship for many of the young directors. 
Such a contract openly stated the ' nancial plan and willingness of the ' lm-directors to invest 
their own work in advance as part of their starting capital, or they were asked to take a loan 
from the bank. If the ' lm was successful in awards and sales, then the ' lm-author would 
23 For the critique of this binarism see Kirn (2012b) and Jovanovi% (2012).
24 See our interview with (ilnik in Kirn et al. (2012), and (i!ek’s point that di) erentiates communism from fascism in aspects of 
political education and the Enlightenment tradition.
25 Mila Turajli%’s ' lm Cinema Komunisto presents the scope of the ' lm studio Avala.
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receive some of the gained surplus value. / is is why it was so important to have a good ' lm 
collective and a solid ' nancial plan.26 Co-production between di) erent republics became 
one of the possible organisational principles of alternative ' lm production. In the year 1968 
for example, the ' lm output was enormous, numbering thirty-two domestic ' lms and nine 
co-productions.
/ e self-management model as mentioned before was particularly harsh towards the 
' lm workers in the tripartite division of labour, which on the one hand pushed workers into 
more precarious and * exible positions, whilst on the other hand, it also pushed them to start 
improving their own political organisation. Film-workers could create ' lm collectives and 
also participate in the new independent ' lm production companies. By the end of the 1960s 
there was an emergence of new ' lm companies, which undermined the binary relationship 
between cinema clubs and large republican ' lm studios. / e most famous examples of these 
' lm companies were Novi Sad’s Neoplanta ((ilnik, Godina, Makavejev, and many others 
worked there), and in the 1970s Belgrade’s Art Film 80 (“Prague school”). Neoplanta was 
of major importance for the late phase of “new Yugoslav ' lm”, where political authorities 
sharpened their a& ack and stigmatised them as “Black Wave”.27 It is not coincidental that a 
large majority of the Black Wave ' lms and short critical ' lms were completed in Neoplanta.
In order to gain a be& er understanding of the functioning of Neoplanta, I would like 
to shortly present a ' nancial/budgetary overview that we published in the book Sur& ng the 
Black, which synthesizes ' ve years of Neoplanta’s activities (1966-1971; 2012: 159-160). 
In short, one can de' ne six di) erent sources of revenue for Neoplanta: the Fund for Cin-
ematography from the Socialist Republic of Serbia; the Fund for Culture from the Socialist 
Autonomous Province of Vojvodina (two feature, six short and two animated films per year); 
profit from past feature films from Neoplanta; an honorarium for commissioned films; the 
production of film documentation (regarding the construction of large objects and urban 
development of cities); and lastly collaboration and work on projects for Television Belgrade 
and Novi Sad. Since the budget for short ' lms was smaller, I will only comment on the pro-
duction costs and revenues from seven feature ' lms: Sveti pesak, Lepa parada, Rani radovi 
((elimir (ilnik), Samrtno prolece, W.R. Misterije organizma (Du#an Makavejev), Dorucak s 
djavolom, and Sloboda ili strip (the la& er was never ' nished, directed by (ilnik and Godina). 
/ e ' nancial picture was as follows: Neoplanta invested 7,074 809 Yugoslav dinars (at the 
then existing exchange rate, this would have meant around 416 thousand dollars) and at the 
end of the cycle they received 2.041,993 dinars (around 120.117 dollars) of added value and 
pro' t, which implies a yearly net income of around 25 thousand dollars. Part of the pro' t 
was re-invested in the ' lm process, while the other part was given to ' lm workers. What can 
be found from this 500-pages long document is that the Fund of Province (27%) and Neo-
planta’s own funds (36%) covered the major part of investments, while the remainder came 
from co-productions.
/ is technical and ' nancial detour into cost-revenue analysis indicates that independent 
' lm production was sandwiched between the federal and republic funds, and that their own 
funds accumulated from their participation in sales and the receiving of (market) awards. 
I name this phenomenon a peculiar kind of “public-private” partnership, whereby market 
self-management entered into relation with state organized cultural activities. / is mixed 
economy could only, to a certain degree, be “adopted” by other cultural activities. A good ex-
ample would be the emerging musical industry epitomized by major festivals such as “Song 
26 Cf our interview with (ilnik (2012).
27 I explain the dilemma surrounding the name Black wave elsewhere (see Kirn 2012b).
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of the year” which gathered audiences of tens of thousands in and around 40-50 major cities 
across Yugoslavia. Yet most of the other cultural ' elds, such as theatre, opera and ballet were 
supported by the budgets at the municipal and republican levels and could not operate in 
such a semi-autonomous manner.28
From the 1970s onwards, apart from the afore-mentioned system of “self-' nancing”, I 
would like to add another important system of ' nancing in the form of “self-contribution”. It 
was very o+ en the case that citizens of municipalities held referenda, which decided on the 
building of the self-management infrastructure: from kindergartens, schools and hospitals to 
cultural centres and small theatres, etc. Instead of waiting for the state to take the initiative, it 
was citizens who took it: obviously a portion of their own salaries were already being invest-
ed in communal areas, such as social housing29 and cultural and welfare activities. However, 
the referenda were at that point not only the sign of larger citizens’ participation, but were 
also a way to gather and redistribute the ' nancial means. One of the positive aspects of such 
self-managed forms of organisation was that it inscribed a mechanism of collective solidarity 
in the centre of its ' nancial redistribution, and hence moved beyond a mere individual char-
ity principle or state initiative. However, the downside of the system of self-contributions 
consisted in them being site-speci' c, meaning that the richer regions and republics would 
be able to invest in more and be& er infrastructure. Also, in times of crisis there would be a 
tendency to invest less in infrastructure.
Specifi c Self-managed Political Forms in Culture: Between 
Improved Institutional Frameworks and Privileged Access to the 
Financial Circuit (National Culture)
Katja Praznik’s study illustrates clearly that cultural policy and the framework and capacities 
of cultural institutions were constantly changing, even if the tendency towards the produc-
tion of an autonomous ' eld of culture remained a driving feature in the socialist period. If 
this general tendency is true, let me highlight a few speci' cities, which in the period a+ er 
market reform, and in particular during the 1970s, relatively improved the institutional 
framework, and even “democratized” the process of decision-making. What unfolded in 
the 1970s was the material transfer of ' nancial capacities to lower levels of cultural institu-
tions. / us, now instead of the ministry of culture at the level of the republic distributing the 
budget, one needed to then take into account the “Communities of Culture”, which were 
institutions of cultural users and cultural producers, and which was chie* y responsible for 
the basic outlines and decisions of ' nancing the cultural institution and ' nally choosing of 
programs. / is would be then branched out both for speci' c cultural activities and in terms 
of regional territorialisation. (ilnik was –among other things – a president of the Commis-
sion of cinematography for the “community of culture” in Vojvodina (one of the autonomous 
regions in Yugoslavia). / e Commission consisted of one delegate for ' lm distribution in 
Vojvodina, one delegate from television, one delegate from the cultural centres and several 
delegates composed of ' lm authors and producers. Once the Commission had received the 
28 An interesting development can be traced here in the Yugoslav historiography, especially with respect to the “memorial genre” 
of monuments to the revolutionary/national liberation struggle. One of the major studies on the institutional and ' nancial aspects 
has been undertaken by Heike Karge (2010).
29 / e most important study on social housing and how the self-management regulations a) ected or in* uenced what happened in 
reality has been wri& en by Dubravka Sekuli% (2012).
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projects (ilnik said, “we will make decisions on allocating funding according to creativity, 
re* exivity, but also the potential ' nancial revenue of these subjects.”30 Apart from these com-
munities and commissions there were also in* uential congresses of cultural action, which were 
varieties of meetings concerning how to self-manage cultural activities. / e representatives 
of the ministries and municipalities explained the functioning of the ' nancial system and in 
what ways work would be organized, and from these reports with statistical data were then 
produced. Also, there existed a network of O)  ces for Culture that researched the system and 
' nances of the cultural ' eld.
Commissions and especially the cultural communities were other names for the “self-
managed communities of interest”, which practiced “double representation” also in the ap-
paratus of social and cultural services. As stated in (ilnik’s example, this would mean having 
delegates from di) erent parts of the cultural ' eld and orchestrating constant communica-
tion between producers and users in order to avoid top-bo& om directives from one “centre” 
and ' nancing without consultation. Lev Kre+ , a philosopher of aesthetics, was active in the 
dra+ ing of o0  cial cultural policy from the 1970s onwards and described one of the positive 
tendencies of self-management in the ' eld of culture. At the start of the 1970s increasingly 
fewer ' nancial capacities were allocated by the ministry of culture (from the republic), in 
Kre+ ’s words: 
the economy of culture became of a much be& er quality once the ' nancial components 
and discussions had been transferred to the self-managed communities of interest. In the 
' eld of culture these self-managed communities of interest worked fairly well during the 
1970s, both on the republican (Slovenian) level and in Ljubljana, as they could a) ord to 
cover not only a large part of the national cultural institutions, but also the majority of what 
was then alternative, non-institutional culture in Ljubljana. In those times the functioning 
of cultural activities, both in terms of open, democratic and transparent discussion as well 
as ' nancing was be& er organized than during the 1960s, and also be& er than a+ erwards in 
the transition during the 1990s.
We have to also keep a critical distance from the institutional and legal aspect of self-man-
agement, which unquestionably in its ideal form strived to improve and extend self-manage-
ment rights from the sphere of production to the sphere of reproduction and non-economic 
activities. However, one should also not forget that in political practice, the plurality of self-
management forms did not always match according to the le& er and spirit of the law. In re-
ality, this meant that there was a strong privileging of mainstream institutions of national 
culture, and ,opi" argues that there was a “mixing of interests between users and produc-
ers” (1997: 73), where partial interests rather than general interest would be discussed. Also, 
at least for many independent cultural workers there was highly “unequal access to public 
' nancing” (1997: 80): if one belonged to one of the major theatres or other elite cultural 
institutions, one had a structurally privileged position relative to those who belonged to the 
sphere of non-institutional and alternative cultural agencies. Despite the fact that the initia-
tive was progressively transferred to the level of “self-managed individuals” and cultural col-
lectives, the amount of ' nances marked for culture remained the same. As Praznik states, in 
the late 1970s in the Slovenian republic this amounted to around 4% of BDP (2013: 105). 
Moreover, in the cultural institutions, one did not always ' nd an active and constantly debat-
ing set of delegates. To sum up, if it is true that in the 1970s in particular the sphere of cultural 
activities had been institutionally improved and was wheeling between the state, self-man-
30 From a personal correspondence with (elimir (ilnik.
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aged interest communities and market,31 in its material politics the accessibility and level of 
public ' nances for culture remained limited. / ere was more in* uence over discussions and 
the distribution of funds, and also as we saw, there was a possibility of “self-contributions” 
from citizens. However, with the growth of the cultural ' eld (the number of association and 
cultural workers grew steadily), there was a strong pa& ern of reproduction as concerns privi-
leged cultural institutions. 
So far very li& le scholarly a& ention has been given to the precarious conditions of the 
cultural worker in socialist times apart from some observations made by Boris Buden (2009) 
and Pavle Levi (2007). / e perspective of the cultural worker is one of particular relevance, 
because it embodies a limit case in the more general system of socialist employment. Susan 
Woodward (1995) pointed out that Yugoslav economic policy focused primarily on those 
who were employed in the social sector, that is, those with a regular salary and all social 
bene' ts, while it ignored the private sector and forms of seasonal, temporary and/or * exible 
employment, and most of all unemployment, which from 1960s onwards became a serious 
problem. / e cultural worker in some sense internally subverted, or anticipated the ' gure 
of the self-manager as a * exible and precarious worker with few securities that was so well 
explained in the literature of (post)operaist thinkers, such as Toni Negri, Paolo Virno, Sergio 
Bologna and others. Here I would like to highlight that in the cultural sphere, and in particu-
lar in the case of ' lm, the more * exible labour relationship became a reality as early as the late 
1950s. In the words of Pavle Levi:
Workers’ councils were thus introduced as decision-making bodies overseeing ' lm produc-
tion, distribution, and exhibition, while the creative personnel associated with the process 
of ' lmmaking (directors, cinematographers, screenwriters) were given the status of free-
lance professionals. (2007: 15)
/ is free-lance position was formally given to some artists and cultural workers by the Min-
istry of Culture. However, we can speak of the proliferation of cultural associations and in-
dependent cultural workers only in the late 1970s/1980s. / e freelance status evidently did 
not just mean a (* ex)secure and autonomous position that would be emancipated from the 
state, but had to do with an intensi' ed precarious position, that did not enjoy the same social 
bene' ts as other regular jobs meaning lower pensions and o+ en unpaid holidays (see Praznik 
2013: 95-101). / is precarious status a) ected socialist cultural workers in various collabora-
tions ranging from amateur cultural associations, to more established galleries, academies, 
and bigger cultural institutions. / is resulted in what is today best known as irregular work 
on projects. And in this respect, there is no di) erence between the features from the post-
socialist epoch, or their Western counterparts; that is, cultural work consisted of seasonal 
and intense work in some periods, and times of unemployment in other periods. Apart from 
this certain groups of cultural workers and cultural institutions enjoyed a large degree of 
autonomy and a relatively solid material subsistence – in particular, the younger generation 
– and a more independent alternative culture even if this remained within a set of constraints 
that should not be idealized.
31 / ere is also an extensive study by Stevan Majstorovi% (1980), which addresses some of the major issues of cultural policy and 
cultural activities in Yugoslav self-management.
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Final Remarks
/ is contribution shed some light on the hybrid of social ownership that developed in Yugo-
slavia from the late 1950s to the early 1970s in the area of ' lm activity. My analysis concludes 
that the cultural self-management infrastructure was well functioning in the 1960s and -due 
to stable economic growth – ' lm studios, cinema clubs, and independent ' lm studios cre-
ated a complex web of social relationships without which we cannot fully understand this 
most exciting period in the history of Yugoslav ' lm. Moreover, the new Yugoslav ' lm in-
dustry was able to acquire a relative autonomy from the state, since it developed a complex 
web of private-public ' nancing initiative and was even scoring pro' ts from production of 
' lms. / is self-managed cultural autonomy can be understood both as a part of more * ex-
ible market reforms and o0  cial cultural policy. However, I have also suggested that it be read 
along the lines of collective organizational e) orts on the part of ' lm workers (e.g. Neoplanta) 
and improved conditions regarding cultural infrastructure. In many respects this ambivalent 
organization of the ' lm ' eld, an in-betweeness between the informal and formal, on the one 
hand pointed to * exibility and the more precarious position of the ' lm workers, whilst on 
the other hand it also o) ered a platform for critical and internationally renowned ' lms. It was 
in this contradictory movement that I located the paradox of social ownership in ' lm activity 
within the stable and well functioning cultural infrastructure.
Despite my criticism of certain proto-capitalist tendencies following the market reform 
in 1965, I nevertheless evaluate the changes positively, at least in the cultural sphere, as part 
of a conscious move towards the empowerment of self-managing communities of interest. 
/ is move actually enabled a far more transparent and democratic system of ' nancing (and 
discussion over those) of the cultural activities. However, yet again, despite this institutional 
* exibility, the system still reproduced general inequalities within the cultural sphere (i.e. 
dominant cultural institutions versus alternative), and did not ward against the growing pre-
carity of many cultural workers. / is paradoxical movement of self-managed ' lm activity – 
rather than returning to the tropes of “repression” and “dissidence” – points to the structural 
problems a+ er 1965: market reform; the introduction of television (Goulding 2002: 64-65); 
and ' nally the pervasive ideology of national culture(s) within the republics that granted 
privileged access to established genres and institutions. / is can shed some further light on 
our understanding of the current post-socialist condition, which rather than constituting 
de' nite break from the 1980s compared to the 1990s, could be seen as a radicalization of the 
processes from the later socialist period. 
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Nacrt za razumijevanje dru#tvenog vlasni#tva te sfere kulture 
i fi lma u socijalisti"koj Jugoslaviji u razdoblju 1960-1970
Sa$etak
Ovaj tekst kriti!ki propituje kako se ideja samoupravljanja mijenjala i konkretizirala u Jugoslaviji 
posebice tijekom $ezdesetih i sedamdesetih godina dvadesetoga stolje#a. U prvom dijelu rada daje 
se pregled politike samoupravljanja te njezinog paradoksalnog i kontradiktornog razvoja. Drugi dio 
se fokusira na ocrtavanje jugoslavenske kulturne sfere posebno u/na podru!ju " lma u razdoblju od 
kasnih pedesetih do ranih sedamdesetih. To!nije, autor poku$ava ocrtati na!ine na koji su se dru$tveno 
vlasni$tvo i samoupravljanje upisali u kulturnu infrastrukturu, planiranje bud%eta, ukazuju#i na prekarni 
status rada u kulturi. 
Klju!ne rije!i: jugoslavensko samoupravljanje, dru$tveno vlasni$tvo, kulturna infrastruktura, " lmska 
industrija, 1960te-1970te, rad u kulturi
